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THREATENED MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS: 
MAKING A FEDERAL (DTSA) CASE OUT OF IT 
David Bohrer† 
The majority of trade secret theft is an inside job; it is committed 
by employees or business partners departing to take a position with a 
competitive business. Typically, at the time of departure, there is a 
very real threat that trade secrets have already been stolen and will 
be shared with a competitor, but there is no evidence that any such 
theft has actually occurred. The preferred course of action in the eyes 
of the former employer who owns the trade secrets is to immediately 
obtain an injunction enjoining any future or continued 
misappropriation of its trade secrets and requiring the return of its 
protected material—if this relief is available.  
Both state trade secret laws as well as the new federal law, the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”), offer injunctive relief 
for threatened trade secret misappropriation. As between state laws 
and the DTSA, there are significant advantages to bringing the action 
under the DTSA, including procedural efficiency, nationwide service 
of discovery, and reduced costs and time to resolution. The problem is 
that there is little federal precedent on the evidence needed to 
establish threatened misappropriation under the DTSA. 
Because California trade secret law shares a pro-employee 
mobility philosophy with the DTSA, it is a likely source of decisional 
law for federal courts seeking guidance on resolving DTSA claims. 
From California cases, therefore, one can glean specific and 
practical examples that will support entry of an injunction enjoining 
threatened misappropriation under the DTSA. These examples are 
summarized at the conclusion of this article. The goal is to better 
inform the determination whether a former employer confronting the 
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threat of insider trade secret theft has sufficient evidence to make a 
successful DTSA claim. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The great majority of intellectual property (“IP”) theft is 
committed by departing employees or business partners. Until 
recently, the principal method of preventing such insiders from taking 
valuable company information to a competitor was for the employer 
to assert a state law claim for threatened trade secret 
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misappropriation.1 Additional relief is now available due to the 
enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”),2 
which creates a federal cause of action for actual and threatened trade 
secret misappropriation.  
There are compelling reasons why an employer faced with 
insider IP theft may want to bring a federal as opposed to state law 
claim for threatened misappropriation. But what evidence is required 
to prove threatened misappropriation under the DTSA? How does the 
former employer “make a federal case out of it?”3  
While there are not yet enough cases applying the federal law to 
answer the question, certain state court decisions can serve as a good 
predictor of what will be required. Many state courts, mostly in 
California, refuse to enjoin new employment based on the inference 
that it is inevitable that sensitive and proprietary information known 
to a departing employee will be disclosed in the course of the new 
employment (the “inevitable disclosure doctrine”). California and 
other jurisdictions rejecting inevitable disclosure will not enjoin or 
restrict new employment based solely on what the departing 
employee knows, but instead require evidence of words or conduct 
sufficient to demonstrate an actionable threat.4 The DTSA takes a 
																																								 																				
 1. This article focuses on “threatened” rather than “actual” trade secret 
misappropriation, either of which may be enjoined. See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(“UTSA”) issued in 1979 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, available at http://bit.do/UniformTradeSecretsAct. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1985) (“SECTION 2. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. (a) Actual or 
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”) [hereinafter UTSA]; see also id. § 3(a) (further 
explains both types of misappropriation). Most trade secret theft occurs when a departing insider 
joins a competing business. While the former employer does not know of any actual 
misappropriation of its trade secrets, it strongly believes this is likely to happen. Restricting the 
new employment or the use of any trade secrets by the competing business therefore depends on 
whether the threat of misappropriation is sufficient to warrant court intervention. The question 
of what proof is required to establish an actionable threat is the stepping-off point for this 
discussion.  
 2. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153 (May 11, 2016) (codified at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 et seq.) [hereinafter DTSA]. 
 3. The phrase “make a federal case out of it” has roots in efforts by railroads in the late 
1800s to avoid local and state regulation by finding bases for taking disputes into federal courts. 
See Jane Anne Morris, Making a Federal Case Out of It, DEMOCRACY THEME PARK (Jan. 5, 
2015), http://bit.do/FederalCaseOutOfIt. The phrase also can refer to exaggerating the 
seriousness of something, as in “[don’t] make a federal case out of it.” Make a federal case out 
of, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM (2017), http://bit.do/FreeDictionaryFederalCase. As used in this 
article, the phrase works on both levels—insider IP theft, from the employer’s perspective, is 
best addressed by avoiding local and state venues in favor of federal court, and is also a serious 
issue that is not over-exaggerated as requiring significant investment in developing more 
effective solutions. 
 4. Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp. v. Smith, 162 Cal. App. 4th 501, 527-28 (2008); Edifecs Inc. 
	
2017]  THREATENED MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS 509 
similar approach and rejects “inevitable disclosure” as sufficient to 
show threatened misappropriation, so it is appropriate to look to these 
state cases as a guide. 
In Section I, I use a hypothetical to introduce key background 
concepts, namely: a company’s IP is often protectable as trade 
secrets; there are compelling policies behind the protection of trade 
secrets; and, that the majority of trade secret theft is by insiders, who, 
thanks to more recent and steadily advancing digital device and 
wireless communication technologies, can now steal more proprietary 
data and information, in less time, for less money, and more quickly 
than they ever could before. In short, insider theft poses a serious and 
as yet unresolved issue for many employers, particularly technology 
companies whose valuable assets are mostly intangible information. 
Section II explains that the principal strategy for addressing 
insider IP theft is bringing a pre-trial motion early in the case to 
enjoin the threatened misappropriation of trade secrets. However, an 
employer who fails to sufficiently evaluate the strength of its 
misappropriation claim before commencing litigation risks incurring 
huge expenditures of time and money and getting nothing in return. 
These considerations dovetail with the discussion in Section III about 
how bringing a claim under the DTSA may reduce the employer’s 
costs and increase the likelihood of a favorable result. Before 
choosing this option, an employer must address the uncertainty 
surrounding the lack of federal precedent on the proofs required to 
establish a threatened misappropriation under the DTSA. 
Section IV argues that California state court decisions provide a 
reasonable basis for predicting the evidence required to establish 
threatened misappropriation under the DTSA because California trade 
secret law and the DTSA share a pro-employee mobility philosophy 
that rejects inevitable disclosure as a basis for establishing threatened 
misappropriation. Section V reviews specific California cases finding 
threatened misappropriation by a departing insider, and gleans from 
these cases examples of the specific evidence that is most likely 
necessary to make the same showing under the DTSA… or, in other 
words, how to “make a (successful) federal (DTSA) case out of it.”  
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
v. TIBCO Software, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (interpreting Cent. 
Valley). See also UTSA § 6, at 2 (further discussion of evidence required to establish threatened 
misappropriation). 
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I. IP THEFT BY INSIDERS DEPARTING FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT IS A 
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM 
It is another impossibly beautiful morning in Silicon Valley, and 
you arrive at the office imbued with energy and optimism regarding 
your company’s position as a leading developer of self-driving 
vehicle technology. You are the manager of a high profile business 
unit that is developing a laser-based system, referred to as LiDAR, 
that uses the reflection of laser beams off objects to create a real-time 
3D image of the world. The LiDAR images allow your company’s 
autonomous vehicles to “see” their surrounding environment. LiDAR, 
like most of your company’s technology, is powered in large part by 
non-public, trade secrets developed over thousands of research and 
development hours by leading engineers, designers and researchers. 
Sure, there is a frenzied race among dozens of companies and startups 
to commercialize self-driving technology, but your company’s 
technology is better than that of any other competitor and you plan to 
keep it that way. 
You get the text from your CEO before you have the chance to 
boot up your computer. You learn that the night before the CEO 
received an email from the technical director of the LiDAR business 
unit giving his two weeks notice. There was no prior indication that 
this employee was unhappy and he had recently received a sizeable 
salary increase and additional options and other incentives. As the 
manager of the employee’s business unit, you are asked to follow up. 
You walk over to the employee’s work station, where he too is in the 
process of booting up. You are told that the employee has taken a 
higher-paying and more senior position with a large foreign 
telecommunications company that announced a month ago that they 
are going to open a Silicon Valley innovation center focused on 
developing “smart device” technology. He says that he “does not 
expect to be working in the same area at the new place.” He assures 
you that he will cooperate in any transition effort that you request. Per 
company policy, that same day, all company devices are collected, the 
employee signs written forms confirming both that he has returned all 
company data and devices and that he is aware of and has complied 
with previous employment agreements regarding the confidentiality 
of company information, and the employee is escorted from the 
office. 
Notwithstanding the weather, the outlook is no longer sunny. 
The departing technical director has not just been privy to, but in 
many instances also helped develop highly sensitive technical and 
business information that you rightly think of as the intellectual 
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property (IP) assets of your company. Your company’s competitive 
advantage would disappear quickly if the new employer, via your 
technical director, has immediate access to and use of your IP. The 
gross unfairness of a potential competitor avoiding the need to 
independently develop your IP, not to mention the significant risk to 
the new employer that at the end of the day their independent efforts 
might be unsuccessful, is maddening. You want to immediately block 
your technical director from taking the new job or at the very least 
restrict the employment sufficient to protect your IP. 
Fortunately, a significant portion of your IP that is at risk most 
likely qualifies for protection under the law as trade secrets.  
A. What Is a Trade Secret and Why Is It Protected? 
Generally speaking, a trade secret is valuable, proprietary 
information or “know-how” that a business protects from use by 
competitors by taking reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.5 The 
Supreme Court explained in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp that 
there are important public interests compelling protection of trade 
secrets.6 Kewanee arose as a challenge by petitioners that trade secret 
law should be preempted as conflicting with federal patent law. The 
Court held there was no preemption based in significant part upon 
differentiating policies behind protection of trade secrets.7 The Court 
																																								 																				
 5. This definition reflects the definition used in several authoritative sources of trade 
secret law. Forty-eight state jurisdictions have modeled their trade secret laws on the UTSA, 
which states in pertinent part that “‘[t]rade secret’ means information, including a formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Id. § 1(4). California’s version of the UTSA, which was 
enacted in 1985, dropped the requirement that a trade secret be not “readily ascertainable”—
with the result that the defendant is required to specially plead this circumstance as an 
affirmative defense—but otherwise followed the UTSA definition. See California Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.11 (1984) (defining trade secrets 
as information as information that “[d]erives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use”,” and “[i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”). Id. § 3426.1(d)(1)-(2). The DTSA also follows the 
UTSA definition of a trade secret, providing in pertinent part that a trade secret is information 
which “the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep . . . secret”,” and “derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the 
disclosure or use of the information.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2016).  
 6. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482-83, 485-86 (1974).  
 7. Id. at 482-89. 
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said that trade secret law is grounded on “[t]he maintenance of 
standards of commercial ethics,” and that there is an “inevitable cost 
to basic decency to of society when one firm steals from another.”8 It 
also is necessary to protect trade secrets for the “encouragement of 
invention.”9 
B. Trade Secrets in the Corporate Context 
There is widespread recognition that trade secrets hold great 
value from a macro level, as a significant portion of IP in the US, and 
on a micro level, as the result of an employer’s significant investment 
of time and resources.10 In the early 2000s, economists estimated that 
theft of trade secrets costs companies as much as $300 billion per 
year.11 
There is also compelling empirical evidence that the great 
majority of trade secret theft is committed by a company insider—an 
employee, contractor or business partner with authorized access to a 
company’s IP.12 In their 2010 statistical analysis of federal court trade 
																																								 																				
 8. Id. at 481, 487. 
 9. Kewanee stands for the proposition that “[w]ithout guaranteed secrecy, businesses 
would be left to expensive self-help security measures that would disadvantage smaller 
competitors and discourage dissemination of information through sharing.” James H. Pooley, 
The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll, 23:4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1025, 1048-49 (2016) (citing 
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 485-86). 
 10. Pooley, supra note 9, at 1067 (“And never have [trade secrets] been so valuable. As 
reported by Ocean Tomo, the share of public company value represented by intangible 
information leapt from 17 percent in 1975 to 68 percent in 1995 to 84 percent today. This means 
that industry in the span of a single generation has experienced a shift of historic proportions in 
the kind of property it uses to create value.”); Sonya P. Passi, Compensated Injunctions: A More 
Equitable Solution to the Problem of Inevitable Disclosure, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 927 
(2012) (“By their very definition, trade secrets hold great value, and employers often invest 
significant resources in their development and subsequent protection.”) (citing Susan Street 
Whaley, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809, 816 (1999)). 
 11. David S. Almeling, et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal 
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 292 (2010) (citing OFFICE OF THE NAT’L 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC 
COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2002 vii (Feb. 2003), 
http://bit.do/ForeignEconCollectionIndustrialEspionage). Almeling et al. include the 
clarification that “[o]ther studies find different numbers, depending on the methodology used,” 
and cite examples of studies from different time periods, different private and government 
agencies, breaking out direct vs. indirect costs, etc. 45 GONZ. L. REV. at 291 n.8. The core 
insight, whatever the exact estimate, is that the national cost of trade secret theft is extremely 
damaging to US companies—costing tens of billions of dollars at the very least.  
 12. “[A] malicious insider is defined as a current or former employee, contractor, or 
business partner who meets the following criteria: has or had authorized access to 
an organization’s network, system, or data, . . . has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used 
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
the organization’s information or information systems.” GEORGE J. SILOWASH, ET AL., 
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secret decisions issued over fifty-eight years, 1950-2008, David 
Almeling and his co-authors determined that in over 85% of the 
cases, the alleged misappropriator was either an employee or a 
business partner.13 The following year, those researchers applied the 
same statistical methodology to state court trade secret decisions 
issued over the fourteen year period, 1995-2009, and determined that 
in over 93% of the cases, the alleged misappropriator was either an 
employee or a business partner.14 
It has been the case for some time that corporate secrets are lost 
through insiders, but digital tools have dramatically increased the risk 
associated with this theft. Commentator James Pooley sums this up in 
a recent article: “With the arrival of ubiquitous digital devices with 
massive storage and robust wireless communications, the risk profile 
of holding trade secrets has been profoundly and irretrievably altered. 
Never have information assets been so vulnerable to loss.”15 Mr. 
Pooley continues, “The difference today is that digital tools make this 
kind of misappropriation easier, cheaper and harder to detect. . . . 
[t]hey make disappearance of the stolen property simpler and faster. 
And the destination is less likely to be a start-up company in the 
neighborhood. If an employee—or accomplice of an employee—slips 
a DVD into a purse or a USB into a pocket, it may be a matter of days 
or even hours before the perpetrator boards a plane out of the 
country.”16 
Returning to our hypothetical, your company, the employer, is 
suddenly confronting the high likelihood of an insider taking and 
sharing with your competitor valuable company LiDAR IP that is 
entitled to protection under state and federal trade secret law. It is not 
lost on you that the majority of IP theft is committed by insiders such 
as your technical director. Due to advances in digital transfer and 
storage technologies the technical director could have quickly and 
easily transferred from your possession into the hands of your 
competitor huge amount of data. You know the amount of time you 
have to block the use of your IP and collect what has been taken is 
extremely short. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO MITIGATING INSIDER 
THREATS xiii (Paul Ruggiero ed., 4th ed. 2012). 
 13. See Almeling et al., supra note 11, at 294, 302-303. 
 14. David S. Almeling, et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 69 (2011). 
 15. Pooley, supra note 9, at 1066-67. 
 16. Id. at 1067. 
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Your primary legal option is to file a claim for misappropriation 
of your trade secrets. The other possible claims you could bring—
most notably a breach of contract claim for failing to return and/or 
maintain the secrecy of your confidential and proprietary information, 
statutory claims for unfair competition, or state common law claims 
for breach of common law duties or other tortious conduct—can be 
more difficult for a former employer to assert and prove. Breach of 
contract claims asserted in connection with a departing employee 
taking a position with a competitor may be challenged as void and 
unenforceable on the grounds they violate section 16600 of the 
California Business and Professional Code, which states that “every 
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful 
profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent void.”17 To 
the extent the Ninth Circuit and California courts have recognized 
that any such contractual restraints on competition may be enforced, it 
is based on excepting those contractual provisions deemed necessary 
to protect the former employer’s trade secrets—effectively returning 
the focus of the litigation to trade secret misappropriation.18 
Furthermore, California courts and federal courts applying California 
law have held that California’s trade secret law preempts or 
supersedes statutory and common law claims that share a common 
nucleus of facts with the misappropriation claim (as is the case in the 
hypothetical).19  
So you focus on bringing a misappropriation claim. The next 
section discusses the elements of this claim under both federal law, 
the DTSA, and the California law and policies on which the federal 
law is modeled. 
II. BLOCKING OR RESTRICTING NEW EMPLOYMENT BASED ON 
THREATENED MISAPPROPRIATION 
A. Actual Misappropriation Is Not Required 
As you watch your technical director drive out of your 
company’s parking lot for the last time, you are struck by the 
																																								 																				
 17. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (1941); see Thomas Weisel Partners LLC v. BNP 
Paribas, No. 07–6198, 2010 WL 546497, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010) (summarizing 
categories of employee agreements which may implicate a section 16600 violation). 
 18. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, No. 16-cv-03166-JST, 2016 WL 3418537, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016) (citing Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748, 758 (9th Cir. 
2008); Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242 (1965)). 
 19. Section III, infra (summarizing case authority on preemption by CUTSA of specific 
statutory and common law claims). 
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realization that notwithstanding your strong suspicions that a theft has 
occurred (or is about to occur), you have no evidence that your 
employee has retained possession of any confidential information or 
that he has divulged any company information—indeed, you have 
signed statements from the employee that he has not done these 
things. This does not end the inquiry, however. Court intervention is 
not limited to actual misappropriation.  
The UTSA and the numerous state trade secret laws modeled on 
the UTSA authorize injunctions against “actual or threatened 
misappropriation.”20 Similarly, the DTSA states in pertinent part that 
“with respect to a misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may – 
(A) grant an injunction — (i) to prevent any actual or threatened 
misappropriation . . . .”21 Courts have given force to this disjunctive 
language and interpreted “actual” as compared to “threatened” 
misappropriation as separate and distinct triggers of legal remedies. 
Actual misappropriation refers to a misappropriation that has already 
happened.22 Threatened misappropriation occurs when, in the eyes of 
the law, misappropriation is likely enough to happen that a court will 
intervene.23 But what is the likelihood of getting early injunctive 
relief on threatened misappropriation claim (i.e., does the employer 
																																								 																				
 20. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1985) (“Actual or 
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined”); see also CUTSA, CAL. CIV. CODE, tit. 5, § 
3426.2(a) (1984) (stating the same); Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 445.1903(1) (1998) (stating the same); Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE § 134A.003(a) (2013) (stating the same). Cf. Wisconsin Trade Secrets Act, WIS. 
STAT. § 134.90(2) (1985) (“No person, including the state, may misappropriate or threaten to 
misappropriate a trade secret . . . .”).  
 21. DTSA § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i).. 
 22. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1457 (2002) (actual 
misappropriation is “generally speaking, improper acquisition of a trade secret or its 
nonconsensual use or disclosure.”); see also Passi, supra note 10, at 928 (“Actual 
misappropriation means that the trade secrets have already been divulged.”) (citing  Ecolab, Inc. 
v. Paolo, 753 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 
661 (D. Minn. 1986)). 
 23. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1279 (2009) (“‘[T]hreatened 
misappropriation’ means a threat by a defendant to misuse trade secrets, manifested by words or 
conduct, where the evidence indicates imminent misuse.”); see also Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 
162 Cal. App. 4th at 525, 527. A related variation is that a party seeking to establish threatened 
misappropriation “must convince the court of the former employee’s ‘duplicity’ by proffering 
evidence indicating a significant lack of candor or willingness to misuse trade secrets.” Gene 
Codes Corp. v. Thomson, No. 09-14687, 2011 WL 611957, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2011) 
(citing and quoting from CMI Intern., Inc. v. Intermet Intern. Corp., 251 Mich. App. 125, 134 
(2002) (citations omitted)); see also Passi, supra note 10, at 928 (“Threatened misappropriation 
occurs when the departing employee has demonstrated a bad-faith intent to divulge trade secret 
information.”) (citing Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Wis. 
2009)).  
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have sufficient proof to justify the time and expense of bringing a 
claim)? 
Any right-thinking litigant should know or at least want to know 
whether they have a strong case on the merits before they file a 
lawsuit. In the case of an employer considering suing a recently-
departed employee and possibly the new employer/competitor, the 
need for an accurate and early evaluation whether there is sufficient 
proof of a threatened misappropriation is particularly acute. 
The employer must plead in good faith facts sufficient to support 
a claim for threatened trade secret misappropriation or its pleading 
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.24 While courts deciding 
motions to dismiss directed to the sufficiency of the allegations in a 
pleading have significant discretion to dismiss the complaint without 
prejudice to amend,25 the additional delay occasioned by amending 
and resubmitting the complaint adds weeks (if not months) to the 
earliest time by which the plaintiff employer could reasonably expect 
the court to address the merits, which is anathema to the employer 
who seeks relief from the court before the threatened 
misappropriation ripens into an actual misuse. 
B. Employers Will Likely Seek Injunctive Relief  
The plaintiff former employer, in most if not all instances, will 
also seek a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)26 or a preliminary 
injunction27 enjoining the threatened misappropriation. They are 
compelled to do so by the fundamental risk that absent immediate 
injunctive relief their trade secrets will be disclosed to and misused by 
a competitor. Should matters progress to where an actual 
																																								 																				
 24. See, e.g., Edifecs, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1320-21 (supporting its holding that the 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted for threatened 
misappropriation under California law, the court said that the allegations were speculative and 
insufficient to show the departing employee’s words or conduct rose to the level of an 
actionable threat of trade secret theft). 
 25. This was the case in Edifecs. Id. 
 26. An injunction may be entered on a temporary and emergency basis prior to trial. 
Typically referred to as a temporary restraining order or “TRO,” this form of injunctive relief is 
unique in that it may be entered ex parte, i.e., without first informing the opposing party, and 
lasts a very short time—only so long as is necessary to protect against irreparable harm leading 
up to consideration of a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 527(d) (rules 
regarding entry of TRO without notice); FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) (corresponding federal rules). 
 27. In comparison, a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, typically entered 
upon giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to the opposing party. It is intended to 
preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm up through final disposition of the 
litigation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC., §§ 527(a), (e), and (f) (rules regarding preliminary 
injunctions); FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a) (federal rules on same subject). 
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misappropriation has occurred—or, should the former employer 
forego seeking early injunctive relief against threatened 
misappropriation—irreparable damage to the employer’s business 
may have already occurred.28 A core feature of state and now federal 
trade secret protection is that injunctive relief is available prior to the 
actual misappropriation of trade secrets.29 Indeed, some 
commentators take this a step further and argue that “for trade secret 
protection to be effective, it must come prior to misappropriation.”30  
There are differences between the federal and state law 
regarding the requirements for issuing a preliminary injunction.31 But 
whatever the variations, the likelihood of success on the merits is a 
key requirement in the court’s determination whether to grant or deny 
an injunction.32 To satisfy this requirement, the moving party will 
need to submit proof33 sufficient to establish a threatened 
																																								 																				
 28. Passi, supra note 10, at 939 (“In cases of actual misappropriation, the damage to the 
employer’s business has already been done. No amount of monetary damages can restore the 
value of the trade secret.”) (citing Jennifer L. Saulino, Locating Inevitable Disclosure’s Place in 
Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1184, 1191, 1193 (2002)); see also Destinations to 
Recovery v. Evolve Initiatives LLC, B259011, 2015 WL 6755049, at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 
2015) (“Defendants’ reading would also mean that former employees would be able to exploit 
their former employer’s trade secrets and confidential information without restraint, subject only 
to a later suit for damages after the fact. But a damages remedy will often come too late to 
protect those rights or to protect the employer. Trade secrets and proprietary information are 
valuable because they are confidential; once exploited by the former employee, a damages 
remedy is of little use to a defunct employer.”) (emphasis in original). 
 29. Passi, supra note 10, at 939 (“[F]or trade secret protection to be effective, it must 
come prior to misappropriation.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Under federal law, the standards for issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) and 
preliminary injunction are the same. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 
U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only 
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). The plaintiff must show (1) that it is likely to 
succeed on the merits, (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) that an injunction is in 
the public interest. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Compare the elements which must be satisfied to obtain a preliminary 
injunction in a California court, as described in ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton, 126 Cal. App. 
4th 1006, 1016 (2005) (“A preliminary injunction is governed by the following principles: ‘In 
deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court weighs two interrelated factors: 
the likelihood the moving party ultimately will prevail on the merits, and the relative interim 
harm to the parties from the issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.’”) (quoting Whyte v. 
Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1449-50 (2002)). The standards applicable to 
issuance of a TRO under California law are similar to those applicable to a preliminary 
injunction. San Diego Water Co. v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 101 Cal. 216, 218 (1894). 
 32. 126 Cal. App. 4th at 1016. 
 33. In view of the time constraints, federal courts generally permit counsel some leeway 
in demonstrating the factors relevant to issuing a preliminary injunction, which can be based on 
	
518 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.   [Vol. 33 
misappropriation of trade secrets. In other words, early on—if not 
immediately upon commencing a trade secret case—the former 
employer will need not just good faith allegations but court 
admissible evidence sufficient to prove threatened misappropriation. 
The practical consequence of the above need for compelling 
claim formation and supporting proofs early on in any trade secret 
litigation is that the former employer likely incurs fees and costs in 
the tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of dollars within months of 
filing a lawsuit. Even assuming there is a high value placed on 
obtaining injunctive relief from the court, the high costs associated 
with getting this result necessarily compel the former employer and 
his counsel to consider the risk of an adverse result. The less 
compelling the proofs to establish a threatened misappropriation, the 
less likely success on the merits or obtaining injunctive relief can be 
achieved, and simultaneously the greater the risk of an adverse result 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
evidence less complete than summary judgment or trial on the merits. See Six Clinics Holding 
Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[A] preliminary injunction 
is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less 
complete than in a trial on the merits. A party thus is not required to prove his case in full at a 
preliminary injunction hearing.”); GSI Tech., Inc. v. United Memories, No. C 13-1081 PSG, 
2013 WL 122172990, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2013) (“To prove a likelihood of success on the 
merits, a plaintiff need not prove its case to an absolute certainty—it only needs to show a 
reasonable probability, or at an “irreducible minimum,” a “fair chance” of success on the 
merits.”). A district court is still required to make findings of fact in supporting the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 
1993) (“Although the district court may employ informal procedures and rely on generally 
inadmissible evidence, the record must nevertheless support the district court’s decision. Indeed, 
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that ‘in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds for its decisions.’”). District courts will therefore conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, or, short of that, expect the moving party to submit proofs in the form of 
sworn declarations or deposition transcripts. See id. (discussing the need for an evidentiary 
hearing or, in the alternative, the option that “the district court can accept evidence in the form 
of deposition transcripts and affidavits”). In comparison, while preliminary injunction procedure 
varies among state courts, see for example, City of Los Altos v. Barnes, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 
1198 (1992) (because a hearing on a preliminary injunction was not the equivalent of a trial, a 
statement of decision was not required under California law), courts typically are required to 
make factual findings on the relevant factors, see for example, Fleishman v. Superior Court, 102 
Cal. App. 4th 350, 356 (2002) (“Before issuing a preliminary injunction, the trial court must 
‘carefully weigh the evidence and decide whether the facts require . . . such relief.’ The court 
evaluates the credibility of witnesses and makes factual findings on disputed evidence.”) 
(citation omitted). Thus, similar to federal court procedure, state courts determining disputed 
factual issues raised by a preliminary injunction will receive evidence on these issues in the 
form of a verified complaint, sworn declaration, or deposition testimony. See, e.g., ROBERT I. 
WEIL, ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, Injunctions ¶ 
9.581 (June 2016) (discussing how, in addition to a verified complaint, “[s]worn testimony or 
admissions contained in depositions, answers to interrogatories, or other discovery may also be 
used to prove facts supporting injunctions.”). 
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that outweighs the return (value) on incurred costs. The sooner and 
better the evaluation as to whether there is sufficient proof of 
threatened misappropriation, the more likely it is that the employer 
avoids spending too much on litigation.  
Further increasing the potential risk and costs of bringing a 
lawsuit is that a prevailing party may seek reimbursement of the fees 
and costs it incurred in the course of defending the action.34 The field 
of trade secret litigation is littered with court decisions holding that 
threatened trade secret misappropriation has not been proven (or that 
the claim will likely not be successful), that trigger prevailing party 
motions for fees and costs.35 These fee motions are themselves a 
separate and additional phase of the litigation that are time-consuming 
and expensive to process—to say nothing of the significant size of the 
fee award that may be assessed on the losing employer.36 
III. WHILE BRINGING A DTSA CLAIM MAY HAVE ADVANTAGES 
OVER BRINGING A STATE TRADE SECRET LAW CLAIM, THERE IS 
NOT SUFFICIENT DTSA PRECEDENT TO PREDICT PROOF 
REQUIRED TO SHOW ACTIONABLE THREAT 
A full analysis of the comparative benefits of filing a claim 
under the DTSA as compared to state trade secret law is best reserved 
until sufficient time has passed to allow consideration of a larger 
number of DTSA decisions. That said, even at this early stage in the 
development of DTSA precedent, it is apparent that there are 
compelling reasons why plaintiff employers should file their trade 
secret claims under the DTSA.  
																																								 																				
 34. See UTSA § 4 (“Attorney’s Fees. If (i) a claim of misappropriation is made in bad 
faith, (ii) a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or (iii) willful and 
malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party.”); DTSA § 2(b)(3)(D) (“[I]f a claim of the misappropriation is made in bad 
faith, which may be established by circumstantial evidence, a motion to terminate an injunction 
is made or opposed in bad faith, or the trade secret was willfully and maliciously 
misappropriated, award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Conxall Corp. v. Iconn Sys., LLC, 61 N.E.3d 1081, 1088-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016); SASCO v. Rosendin Elec., Inc., 207 Cal. App. 4th 837, 843-44 (2012); FLIR Sys., Inc., 
174 Cal. App. 4th at 1285-86; Contract Materials Processing, Inc. v. Kataleuna GmbH 
Catalysts, 222 F. Supp. 2d 733, 744-45 (D. Md. 2002). 
 36. See, e.g., FLIR Systems, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1286 (on appeal, the court affirmed 
award of $1,641,216.78 for attorney fees and costs to the party accused of trade secret theft); 
SASCO, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 843 (same in the amount of $484,943.46); Contract Materials, 222 
F. Supp. 2d at 753 (same in the amount of $134,935). 
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The DTSA is aligned in many respects with the UTSA on which 
state trade secret laws are modeled.37 More specifically, the DTSA 
includes definitions, remedies, and a statute of limitations 
substantially similar to the UTSA.38 As Congress observed, “quite a 
few states have enacted customized versions of the UTSA, resulting 
in a lack of uniformity that makes [state trade secret statues] not 
wholly effective in a national and global economy.”39 A principal 
motivation behind the enactment of the DTSA was to provide a 
“single, national standard for trade secret misappropriation with clear 
rules and predictability for everyone involved.”40 While this policy is 
aspirational at this point, assuming the goal of creating a federal 
common law consistently applied across the country is ultimately 
realized, this means the DTSA provides plaintiff employers a more 
efficient and cost-effective platform for the protection of their trade 
secrets.41 
The ability to bring a DTSA claim also gives trade secret owners 
the benefit of national service of discovery that is provided by federal 
courts (that hear DTSA claims) and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (that govern the processing of these claims by the federal 
courts).42 The advantages to the trade secret owner of being able to 
serve nationwide subpoenas or to proceed with discovery anywhere in 
the country—as opposed to litigating in state court under a state-
based statute and its attendant procedural hurdles and delays—in the 
words of commentator Mark Halligan, “cannot be overemphasized.”43 
It is true that, prior to enactment of the DTSA (creating a federal 
cause of action giving the federal courts “federal question” subject 
																																								 																				
 37. Are You Ready for the Defend Trade Secrets Act?, PRACTICAL LAW (May 2, 2016) 
http://bit.do/ReadyDefendTradeSecretsAct. 
 38. Adams Arms, LLC v. Unified Weapon Sys., Inc., No. 16-1503, 2016 WL 5391394, at 
*5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2016) (citing H. REP. NO. 114-529, at 4-5, 12-14 (2016), as reprinted in 
2016 U.S.C.C.A.N. 195-211). 
 39. H. REP. NO. 114-529 at 4 (2016). 
 40. Id. at 6. 
 41. See Pooley, supra note 9, at 1052 (referring to commentary that has “pointed out that 
economic advantages of federalization, particularly for small businesses, which rely more 
heavily on secrecy than on patenting . . .”) (citing David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a 
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 769, 773-74 
(2009)). 
 42. R. Mark Halligan, Revisited 2015: Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical 
Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 14 J. MARSHAL. REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
476, 493 (2015) (“This procedural advantage is critical in trade secrets litigation. Often the 
plaintiff resides in one state; the defendant resides in another; and the evidence of 
misappropriation and critical witnesses are in different states around the country.”). 
 43. Id. at 494. 
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matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331), a trade secret plaintiff 
could get its state-based trade secret claim heard in federal court, but 
this required (and still requires) the more difficult showing of 
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 or that the state trade secret claim shares the same or similar 
operative facts with some other federal question claim allowing the 
federal court to exercise pendent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1367.44 
Another feature of the DTSA favoring trade secret plaintiffs is 
that it does not incorporate the requirement often applied in the course 
of state trade secret litigation that before commencing trade secrets 
discovery, the plaintiff must identify its relevant trade secrets with 
“reasonable particularity.”45 Requiring plaintiff to list the specific 
trade secrets that it is asserting prior to the parties engaging in 
discovery serves legitimate policies such as avoiding guesswork by 
defendant and the court about alleged trade secrets, allowing the court 
to set parameters on discovery and providing the defendants a fair 
opportunity to prepare their defense.46 However, the requirement also 
creates logistical hurdles for the plaintiff and an opportunity for 
defendants to engage in motions practice that delays and sidetracks 
the disposition of the case on the merits.47 In comparison, the DTSA, 
which does not impose the threshold determination, gives plaintiff a 
																																								 																				
 44. See id. (citing Roy E. Hofer & Susan F. Gullotti, Presenting the Trade Secret 
Owner’s Case, in PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 1985, at 145, 159-61 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 196, 1985)). 
 45. California has adopted legislation codifying this requirement. See Cal. Code Civ. 
Proc. § 2019.210 (in action alleging misappropriation of trade secret, before commencing 
discovery, party alleging misappropriation must identify trade secret with “reasonable 
particularity”). Courts in other states impose the requirement in the course of exercising their 
discretion to control trade secret discovery. See, e.g., MSCI Inc. v. Jacob, 945 N.Y.S.2d 863, 
865 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he court is persuaded that the law requires that a trade secret plaintiff 
identify trade secrets with reasonable particularity early in the case.”) (citing Xerox Corp. v. 
IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)); Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 
33 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“Where, as here, a plaintiff in a trade secret case seeks to discover the trade 
secrets and confidential proprietary information of its adversary, the plaintiff will normally be 
required first to identify with reasonable particularity the matter which it claims constitutes a 
trade secret, before it will be allowed (given a proper showing of need) to compel discovery of 
its adversary’s trade secrets.”) 
 46. See Computer Economics, Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (S.D. 
Cal. 1999) (summarizing the purposes of the rule with citations to supporting authority).  
 47. See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 831 
(2005) (The court observed that there had been protracted briefing and argument by the parties 
regarding the sufficiency of plaintiff’s thrice-amended trade secret complaint, concluding “[a]s a 
result, the parties have created a voluminous record, expended thousands of dollars on attorney 
fees and expert witnesses, and consumed considerable judicial resources without ever even 
beginning to conduct discovery”) (emphasis added). 
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faster and easier path to discovery and injunctive relief—the primary 
sources of settlement leverage in a trade secret case.48  
The DTSA also is expressly non-preemptive; it does not by its 
terms preempt or supersede common law state claims.49 In contrast, 
states such as California have interpreted their versions of the UTSA 
as preempting or superseding non-contractual remedies that share a 
common nucleus of facts with a trade secret claim.50 For example, 
claims of trespass to chattels,51 unfair competition,52 breach of 
fiduciary duty,53 and interference with contract54 have been held 
preempted by the California trade secret statute. Plaintiff trade secret 
owners could be highly motivated to bring suit under the DTSA, 
allowing them to bring a host of state law common claims heretofore 
deemed preempted under state court trade secret statutes.55 
Unfortunately for the plaintiff employer convinced that filing 
under the DTSA is the way to go, there is little in the way of case 
precedent on the proof required to establish a federal claim for 
threatened misappropriation. Only a small number of decisions 
involving the DTSA have been issued since its enactment less than a 
year ago on May 11, 2016. And of this small available sample, only a 
limited number of the decisions granted early injunctive relief on a 
trade secret claim: Engility Corp. v. Charles Aaron Daniels et al.,56 
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Jennifer Cook,57 Earthbound Corp., et al. v. 
																																								 																				
 48. Warren Braunig & Andrea Nill Sanchez, What the Defend Trade Secret Act Means 
for California, THE RECORDER, July 18, 2016, at 9. 
 49. The DTSA does not “preempt any other provision of law.” S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 
2(f) (2016). 
 50. Angelica Textile Servs., Inc. v. Park, 220 Cal. App. 4th 495, 505-06 (2013). 
 51 NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc., No. 13-05058, 2015 WL 400251, at *16 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 29, 2015). 
 52. SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity Corp., No. 12-00694, 2012 WL 6160472, at *16 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 11, 2012). 
 53. Mattel v. MGA Ent., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 54. K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. and Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 
939, 960-61 (2009). 
 55. In addition to the features already discussed, the DTSA also provides that a trade 
secret owner can apply ex parte for a court order “providing for the seizure of property 
necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of 
the action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i). This was a hotly contested provision and by its 
own terms is available only in “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at (3)(A)(iii). So exceptional are 
the preconditions to obtaining this relief that it is the opinion of many commentators, present 
company included, that it will rarely, if ever, be awarded. Indeed, to-date there are no reported 
decisions discussing—let alone imposing—the ex parte seizure order. 
 56. Engility Corp. v. Charles Aaron Daniels et al., No. 16-2473, 2016 WL 7034976, at 
*14 (D. Colo. Dec. 2, 2016) (granting motion for preliminary injunction in part). 
 57. Henry Schein, Inc., 2016 WL 3418537, at *10-11 (granting motion for preliminary 
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MiTek USA, Inc.,58 OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov,59 and 
Prot. Techs., Inc. v. Ribler.60 It is difficult to discern trade secret rules 
and evidence specific to federal DTSA claims in four of these cases, 
Engility Corp., Henry Schein, Inc., Earthbound Corp., and Prot. 
Techs., Inc., because in each case the plaintiff also asserted state law 
trade secret claims and the court did not differentiate between state 
and federal trade secret law as the basis for its findings. The decisions 
in Henry Schein, Inc., Earthbound Corp., and OOO Brunswick Rail 
Mgmt. are also distinguished in that they involve actual as opposed to 
threatened misappropriation.61 
Closest to the mark is Engility Corp., in which the federal court 
entered a preliminary injunction imposing a one-year ban on 
defendants competing with the plaintiff former employer based upon 
the court’s finding that there was persuasive evidence that defendants 
“retain[_] some portion of [plaintiff’s] trade secrets” and that there 
was evidence demonstrating “a propensity [on the part of defendants] 
for making surreptitious copies of the relevant data.”62 While Engility 
might provide at least one example of proofs sufficient to show 
threatened misappropriation under the DTSA, its precedential 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
injunction in part); see also Henry Schein, Inc. v. Jennifer Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1079-80 
(N.D. Cal. June 10, 2016) (granting application for temporary restraining order in part). 
 58. Earthbound Corp., et al. v. MiTek USA, Inc., No. 16-1150, 2016 WL 4418013, at 
*11-12 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) (granting application for temporary restraining order). 
 59. OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov, No. 5:17-CV-00017-EJD, 2017 WL 67119, 
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (granting application for temporary restraining order). 
 60. Prot. Techs., Inc. v. Ribler, No. 317CV00144LRHWGC, 2017 WL 923912, at *1 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 8, 2017) (granting application for temporary restraining order). 
 61. See Henry Schein, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d at 1077 (the court determined that plaintiff 
former employer was likely to succeed on allegations “that Cook has already misappropriated 
HSI’s customer information and south to solicit and divert customers”) (emphasis added); 
Earthbound Corp., 2016 WL 4418013, at *10 (the court found that “there is strong 
circumstantial evidence that Defendants misappropriated the trade secrets in question,” citing, 
among other things, evidence that that defendants, while still employed with plaintiff, 
established relationships with a primary competitor and shared plaintiff’s confidential 
information with this competitor) (emphasis added);	 OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt., 2017 WL 
67119, at *1 (“Brunswick's evidence shows that Sultanov and Ostling improperly disseminated 
confidential information—e.g., by emailing documents to their personal accounts and then 
disclosing this information to third parties”) (emphasis added). 
 62. Engility Corp., 2016 WL 7034976, at *11. See also Prot. Techs., Inc., 2017 WL 
923912, at *1 (the court entered a TRO requiring the departing employee to return confidential 
information and refrain from soliciting prior employer’s customers where there was no apparent 
evidence of actual misappropriation – the employee had downloaded confidential information to 
a private drive and emailed the information from his company email account to himself; 
however, given the sparse nature of the evidence taken by the court on what was an ex parte 
TRO petition, it was not clear whether the employee had acted without authorization or 
improperly disclosed or used the information). 
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strength is diluted by ambiguity whether the court deemed the 
conduct at issue actual or threatened misappropriation (in addition to 
the previously-mentioned absence of any discussion whether the 
relief awarded was based on either state or federal trade secret laws). 
The lack of federal precedent is explained not just by the recent 
enactment of the DTSA, but also because the DTSA, by its express 
terms, is limited to an “act” of misappropriation that “occurs on or 
after the date of enactment.”63 This is not to say the plaintiff employer 
does not have options pending development of DTSA precedent. As 
discussed in the following sections, certain state trade secret 
jurisdictions, most notably California, are based on the same pro-
employee mobility policy as the DTSA. The plaintiff employer can 
reasonably look to these like-minded state jurisdictions and their court 
decision to predict the level of proof required to establish threatened 
misappropriation under the DTSA. 
IV. PROOF OF THREATENED MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER THE DTSA 
WILL LIKELY FOLLOW CALIFORNIA DECISIONS 
A. California Is Pro-Employee Mobility and Rejects the 
“Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine” 
The inevitable disclosure doctrine permits a plaintiff to prove 
trade secret misappropriation by showing that the defendant’s new 
employment will inevitably lead to reliance on plaintiff’s trade 
secrets.64 Injunctions granted on the basis of inevitable disclosure 
presuppose that “the employee will necessarily rely—consciously or 
unconsciously—upon knowledge of the former employer’s trade 
secrets in performing his or her new job duties.”65 In other words, the 
																																								 																				
 63. Section 2(e) of the DTSA provides in pertinent part: “(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.--The 
amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to any misappropriation of a trade 
secret . . . for which any act occurs on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” DTSA § 
2(e). See Adams Arms, LLC, No. 16-1503, 2016 WL 5391394, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2016) 
(“the Court finds that [plaintiff] may state a plausible claim for relief, if [plaintiff] sufficiently 
alleges a prohibited ‘act’ occurring after May 11, 2016.”). It is ambiguous whether the DTSA 
applies to misappropriation activity that began before the enactment of the DTSA but continues 
thereafter; Congress omitted from the DTSA the provision in the UTSA that it does not apply to 
continuing activity that commenced prior to the effective date of the UTSA, thus leaving the 
door open to infer that the DTSA would apply in this situation. Id. Suffice it to say that at this 
early stage in the life of the DTSA the potential for jurisdictional challenges to claims directed 
to pre- and post- enactment continuing activity may have had the temporary effect of dissuading 
parties from filing claims under the DTSA—as time passes, this particular risk will become 
moot. 
 64. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 65. Id. 
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employee is enjoined from taking the new job just because of what he 
or she knows. 
California, however, rejects the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
The California appellate court in Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co.66 rejected 
the argument that the inevitable disclosure doctrine was an alternative 
to proving actual or threatened misappropriation. The gist of the 
court’s rationale was that application of the doctrine results in the 
after-the-fact imposition by the court of a covenant not to compete 
that unduly infringes California’s strong policies favoring employee 
mobility: 
The decisions rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine correctly balance 
competing public policies of employee mobility and protection of trade 
secrets. The inevitable disclosure doctrine permits an employer to enjoin 
the former employee without proof of the employee’s actual or threatened 
use of trade secrets based upon an inference (based in turn upon 
circumstantial evidence) that the employee inevitably will use his or her 
knowledge of those trade secrets in the new employment. The result is not 
merely an injunction against the use of trade secrets, but an injunction 
restricting employment.67 
Business and Professions Code section 16600 generally prohibits 
covenants not to compete, and California public policy strongly favors 
employee mobility. Business and Professions Code section 16600 protects 
a person’s right to “follow any of the common occupations of life” and to 
pursue the “‘business or profession he may choose.’” We agree the 
doctrine of inevitable disclosure “creates a de facto covenant not to 
compete” and “runs[s] counter to the strong public policy in California 
favoring employee mobility.”68 
The court in Whyte acknowledged that California law also 
protects trade secrets and that a non-compete agreement may be 
enforceable notwithstanding the general prohibition of such covenants 
where necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets. But in the 
court’s view this does not save the inevitable disclosure doctrine: 
The chief ill in the covenant not to compete imposed by the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine is its after-the-fact nature: The covenant is imposed 
after the employment contract is made and therefore alters the 
employment relationship without the employee’s consent. When, as here, 
a confidentiality agreement is in place, the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
“in effect convert[s] the confidentiality agreement into such a covenant 
[not to compete].” Or, as another federal court put it, “a court should not 
allow a plaintiff to use inevitable disclosure as an after-the-fact 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
 65. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1458-59 (2002). 
 66. Id. at 1461-62. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1462 (internal citations omitted). 
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noncompete agreement to enjoin an employee from working for the 
employer of this or her choice.”69 
 California’s rejection of inevitable disclosure is often 
described as the minority position.70 It is difficult to discern with any 
degree of precision the jurisdictions that are in the majority or 
minority on this question due to the treatment of inevitable disclosure 
in some jurisdictions as one form of threatened misappropriation,71 
while others, such as California,72 view threatened misappropriation 
as a separate alternative to actual or threatened misappropriation. In 
addition, within the so-called “majority jurisdictions” that reject 
inevitable disclosure, there is significant variation in their respective 
requirements for applying the doctrine, creating a spectrum of cases 
imposing proof requirements that blur the lines demarcating where 
inevitable disclosure ends and threatened misappropriation begins.73 
There also are states such as Florida, Iowa, South Carolina and 
Wisconsin whose highest courts have not addressed inevitable 
disclosure as a means of proving misappropriation.74 What can be 
																																								 																				
 69. Id. at 1462-63 (internal citations omitted). See also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Juhasz, 
924 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (applying California law) (“The doctrine of 
inevitable disclosure is not the law in California.”) (citing FLIR Systems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 
at1277). 
 70. See Passi, supra note 10, at 930, 933. 
 71. See, e.g., Interbake Foods, LLC v. Tomasiello, 461 F. Supp. 2d 943, 973 (N.D. Iowa 
2006) (Interpreting Iowa law, the court stated “the inevitable disclosure doctrine is just one way 
of showing a threatened disclosure in cases where additional evidence showing the existence of 
a substantial threat of impending injury is unavailable to the movant.”). 
 72. See Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 525. 
 73. See Passi, supra note 10, at 930 (The commentator observes that “the majority of 
states, recognize this doctrine, albeit with varying understandings of ‘inevitability.’”); see also 
Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 802, 820 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (court declined 
to award injunction based on inevitable disclosure doctrine due to lack of evidence of bad faith); 
Tactica Intern., Inc. v. Atlantic Horizon Intern., Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 586, 608 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) 
(applying New York law, conditioned application of inevitable disclosure doctrine on whether 
the departing employee had sufficient seniority); H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc. 
Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (applying Missouri law, required that 
departing employee actually participated in the creation of the trade secret as compared to 
simply having knowledge of it.). 
 74. See Clorox Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 954, 967 (E.D. Wisc. 
2009) (“The parties have yet to cite a Wisconsin court that has addressed whether the inevitable 
disclosure theory is viable under Wisconsin’s trade secret laws.”); Interbake Food, LLC, 461 F. 
Supp. 2d at 957 (“Although the Iowa Supreme Court has not affirmatively ruled on the viability 
of such a doctrine in Iowa, at least one federal court in Iowa has determined that the Iowa Trade 
Secrets Act provides protection from the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets.”); Del Monte 
Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (district court 
refused to apply inevitable disclosure doctrine because the Florida state courts had neither 
expressly adopted or rejected the doctrine); Nucor Corp. v. Bell, No. 06-02972, 2008 WL 
9894350, at *15 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2008) (in the course of choice of law analysis, district court 
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said is that California is at the forefront of the very few state 
jurisdictions that have rejected inevitable disclosure—the others being 
Maryland and Virginia.75  
B. The Defend Trade Secrets Act Is Also Pro-Employee 
Mobility and Rejects “Inevitable Disclosure” 
Coming into the recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, the 
DTSA was amended to close the door on inevitable disclosure in 
much the same fashion as has been done in California. Senator 
Dianne Feinstein of California successfully proposed the following 
amendments expressly confirming that threatened misappropriation 
may not be established merely by the importance of the information 
that someone knows. The relevant portions of her amendment are 
emphasized below: 
(3) REMEDIES.—In a civil action brought under this subsection with 
respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may— 
grant an injunction – 
To prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation described in 
paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided the 
order does not – 
Prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and 
that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence 
of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the 
person knows; or…” 76 
Lest anyone not appreciate that these amendments adopt 
California’s robust policy favoring employee mobility (i.e., the policy 
compelling California courts to reject inevitable disclosure to being 
with), Senator John Cornyn of Texas added an amendment expressly 
incorporating the general prohibition in California and other like-
minded states against restrictive employment covenants and similar 
restraints of trade: 
(3) REMEDIES.—In a civil action brought under this subsection with 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
determined that “South Carolina has not addressed the issue.”) 
 75. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 322 (2004) (referring to the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Whyte, the Maryland appeals court said “[w]e find this reasoning 
persuasive, especially as applied to the circumstances in the case before us. Maryland has a 
policy in favor of employee mobility similar to that of California. . . . For these reasons, we 
conclude that the theory of “inevitable disclosure” cannot serve as a basis for granting a plaintiff 
injunctive relief under MUTSA.”); Gov’t Technology Services, Inc. v. IntelliSys Tech. Corp., 
No. 160265, 1999 WL 1499548, at *1 (Va. Cir. Oct. 20, 1999) (“Under the [Virginia Trade 
Secrets Act], only actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Virginia does not 
recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine.”). 
 76. DTSA, supra note 2.  
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respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may— 
grant an injunction— 
to prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation described in 
paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems reasonable provided the 
order does not— 
prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that 
conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of 
threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person 
knows; or 
otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on 
the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business;” 77 
The district court’s recent decision in Engility, discussed above, 
implicitly interprets these provisions of the DTSA as rejecting 
inevitable disclosure. There, the court said that it could not enjoin the 
defendant from performing work for the former employer’s customer 
under the DTSA based solely on the defendant’s alleged knowledge 
of sensitive trade secrets.78 The court stated in the pertinent part: 
Under the DTSA, the Court cannot grant an injunction that “prevent[s] a 
person from entering into an employment relationship,” and the Court can 
only place conditions on employment “based on evidence of threatened 
misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows.”79  
Engility’s implicit interpretation of the DTSA as rejecting 
inevitable disclosure in favor of employee mobility is supported by 
the great weight of DTSA commentary.80   
																																								 																				
 77. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I)). 
 78. Engility, 2016 WL 7034976, at *10. 
 79. Id.  
 80. See, e.g., Lily Li & Andrea W. Paris, Help! What Are My (Immediate) Defenses to A 
Federal Trade Secret Claim?, ORANGE CTY. LAWYER MAGAZINE, Sept. 2016, at 52 (“The 
DTSA’s rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, which prevents an employee from 
working for a competitor merely because disclosure of trade secrets is a likely possibility, is 
notable.”); Bailey King & Whit Pierce, The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 Is Here, and It’s 
a Big Deal, 58 DRI’S FOR DEF. 42 (July 2016) (“The DTSA does away with this line of attack, 
expressly providing that an injunction cannot ‘prevent a person from entering into an 
employment relationship.’ It further adds that any ‘conditions placed on such employment shall 
be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the 
person knows.’” This provision should negate any ‘inevitable disclosure’ argument that a 
plaintiff attempts to make against a defendant employee.”); ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT, 
U.S.C. §1831 (2013) (“The Act also rejects application of the ‘inevitable disclosure’ doctrine.”); 
Raymond T. Nimmer, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 3:2.30 (2016) (“The first of these 
exclusions apparently rejects the ‘inevitable disclosure’ rule, which courts in some states have 
used in some cases to grant injunctions against an employee moving to another company on the 
basis that the employee would inevitably disclose secrets of the prior employer. The DTSA 
balances this issue in favor of the employee’s right of mobility.”); Joseph D. Mornin, What You 
Need To Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20 (2008) 
(“The DTSA requires “evidence of threatened misappropriation,” that is, it requires an employer 
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C. Threatened Misappropriation Under the DTSA Will Follow 
California Precedent 
California decisions, at least for now, provide the go-to 
precedent for federal courts to use when deciding what proof is 
required to show an actionable threat of misappropriation under the 
DTSA. Currently, there is limited to no federal court precedent on the 
question.81 Faced with the same lack of federal precedent on the 
meaning of “trade secret” under the DTSA, federal courts have relied 
upon state court precedent to define this term, suggesting they will do 
the same thing regarding the standards for defining and proving 
“threatened” misappropriation under the DTSA.82 They will not rely 
upon state court precedent generally, however, because only 
California and a couple other like-minded states share the DTSA’s 
goal of protecting employee mobility (and the consequent rejection of 
enjoining employment based upon inevitable disclosure doctrines).83 
Moreover, looking to California precedent for guidance on the 
application of the DTSA is consistent with the DTSA mandate to 
provide a uniform body of federal trade secret law applied 
consistently across the country.84 Uniformity cannot be achieved if 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
to show more than that a departing employee knows sensitive information. In this respect, state 
law will continue to play an important role in trade secret litigation.”).  
 81. See supra Part III. 
 82. See, e.g., Henry Schein, 2016 WL 3418537, at *4 (the court noted that the DTSA and 
CUTSA included similar definitions of “trade secret” and proceeded to apply California 
decisions interpreting the term); Earthbound Corp., 2016 WL 4418013, at *9 (“In this case, for 
the reasons discussed by Plaintiffs, the Court agrees that detailed information about 
Earthbound’s current and prospective customers, pending projects, bids, pricing, product design, 
and other elements of its business constitute trade secrets under the UTSA. . . . The same 
evidence demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits on Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of 
the Economic Espionage Act, as amended by the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et 
seq. (“EEA”).); Berkeley Risk Adm’rs Co. v. Accident Fund Holdings, Inc., No. 16-2671, 2016 
WL 4472943, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2016) (“The definition of ‘trade secret’ in the federal 
statute and MUTSA are substantially similar. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1839(3) with MINN. STAT. § 
325C.01 Subd. 5. Therefore, the court will construe them as coextensive for purposes of this 
case.”). 
 83. Practically speaking, while precedent from Maryland and Virginia—the other 
jurisdictions rejecting inevitable disclosure—is also relevant, the focus is on California 
precedent because it is a more highly-developed decisional law regarding threatened 
misappropriation in the context of rejecting inevitable disclosure. 
 84. The UTSA failed to achieve its primary objective of correcting the uneven and highly 
varied state court trade secret laws that pre-dated its enactment. In the course of adopting the 
UTSA, states often departed from the official text and/or there was unduly high variation across 
courts regarding the standards governing the application of the UTSA. Federal lawmakers 
believed the country would benefit from a federal trade secret law uniformly applied across the 
country, and enacted the DTSA with this objective in mind. See Sen. Rep. No. 114-220, 114th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (2016).  
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federal courts draw indiscriminately from jurisdictions recognizing 
inevitable disclosure as well as from those that do not in the course of 
determining threatened misappropriation under the DTSA. 
Pending the development over time of federal court precedent on 
the issue, California cases are the best resource for predicting what 
evidence is required to make a DTSA threatened misappropriation 
case. The following section gleans from relevant California precedent 
the proofs most likely to make a federal case for the hypothetical 
introduced in Section I.  
V. PROVING THREATENED MISAPPROPRIATION IN CALIFORNIA 
A. The Hypothetical Demonstrates the Employer’s Concern 
that Disclosure of its Trade Secrets Is Inevitable 
Returning to our hypothetical, your CEO has asked you, the 
manager of the affected business unit, for advice whether to pursue 
formal court action against the recently departed technical director. 
You’ve got a couple hours before the CEO wants to meet on the 
subject. You crack open your laptop and try to organize your 
thoughts. You type the following notes: 
What we know about ex-technical director of our LiDAR 
unit: 
-  Insider 
- Senior level position provided broad access to business 
strategy 
-  High level technical knowledge 
- Access to, exposed to, and helped develop, confidential 
information and trade secrets 
-  Going to what (we believe) is a direct competitor 
- Competitor greatly accelerates development if he 
shares what he knows or is in his possession 
-  Says he has returned all company devices 
- Acknowledges confidentiality agreement, says he has 
complied (“kept nothing,” he says) 
+  BIG fear is that he is still in possession of highly-
sensitive company trade secrets and proprietary 
information, most importantly LiDAR IP 
? But . . . we do not have any evidence right now that he 
has used or disclosed any of our this IP  
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On behalf of the company, you send a quick email to company 
counsel soliciting their advice. In your email, you share your thoughts 
on the technical director’s departure. You also ask whether the 
company should make a claim under the new federal trade secret law 
based on your understanding that the federal law may be more 
favorable to parties asserting trade secret rights and that it also may 
be less costly as compared to litigating under the state court trade 
secret law. Company counsel responds by email:  
Based	 on	 what	 you	 have	 told	 me	 so	 far,	 we	 do	 not	 have	
enough	evidence	-	whether	we	bring	claim	under	California	
or	 federal	 law,	 we	 can’t	 rely	 on	 argument	 that	 theft	 is	
inevitable	 (which	 is	 what	 we	 could	 argue	 based	 on	 what	
you’ve	given	me).	
B. But Additional Evidence Beyond Inevitable Disclosure Is 
Needed To Establish Threatened Misappropriation 
Your quick reply to counsel: 
  Ok, so what more do I need? 
The question, in other words, is given that inevitable disclosure 
is not a recognized means of establishing a threat of misappropriation, 
what evidence will be enough to establish such a threat? This question 
was addressed in the California decision Central Valley General 
Hospital v. Smith,85 which came before the court as an appeal of an 
injunction intended to protect against the improper use and disclosure 
of trade secrets. The appeal required the court to resolve the question 
whether the California Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Whyte v. 
Schlage Lock Co. rejecting inevitable disclosure meant that an 
injunction may not be based on threatened misappropriation.86 The 
court rejected this argument on the grounds that threatened 
misappropriation is properly conceptualized as a separate and 
alternate theory for obtaining relief for trade secret 
misappropriation.87 But this begged the question how the proof of 
threatened misappropriation differed from inevitable disclosure.  
In response, the court in Central Valley described three 
“variations” or fact patterns establishing threatened misappropriation 
of trade secrets. The first involves retention of the trade secrets by a 
departing employee who has misused some of the trade secrets in the 
																																								 																				
 85. Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 526-528. 
 86. Id. at 524. 
 87. Id. at 525. 
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past.88 The court cited to ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton89 as an 
example.90 In ReadyLink, the departing employee had been caught 
attempting to steal records regarding his employer’s finances, clients, 
employee contacts, payroll practices and business methodology.91 The 
employee had attempted to use this information both before and after 
his employment to solicit clients and otherwise set up a competing 
business.92 Even though the employee no longer worked for a 
competitor at the time the injunction was issued, the court in 
ReadyLink concluded that “there remained an imminent threat of him 
using the trade secret information to solicit ReadyLink’s employees 
and customers.”93  
The second variant described by Central Valley involves 
continued retention of the trade secrets under circumstances 
establishing that the departing employee intends to use or disclose 
them in the future.94 The injunction entered in Technical Industries, 
Inc. v. Banks95 was cited as an example.96 In Technical Industries, the 
employer’s trade secrets consisted of a proprietary method of 
inspecting oil field pipes to derive unique data.97 The departing 
employee said he intended to use a different software program to 
derive similar data, but his testimony convinced the court that he 
could not act as proposed without using elements of his employer’s 
proprietary pipe inspection system.98 Accordingly, the court found 
there was a threatened misappropriation based upon circumstances 
reflecting the intent to use at least some of the trade secrets in the 
future.99 
The third variant described by Central Valley is that a threatened 
misappropriation occurs where “a defendant possesses trade secrets 
and wrongly refuses to return the trade secrets after a demand for 
																																								 																				
 88. Id. at 527. 
 89. ReadyLink Healthcare, 126 Cal. App. 4th at 1006. 
 90. Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 527. 
 91.  Read Link Healthcare, 126 Cal. App. 4th at 1013. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1101. 
 94. Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 528. 
 95. Technical Industries, Inc. v. Banks, 419 F. Supp. 2d. 903, 913 (W.D. La. 2006). 
 96. Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 528 (citing Technical Industries, Inc. v. 
Banks, 419 F. Supp. 2d. at 913 (entering preliminary injunction enjoining threatened trade secret 
misappropriation)). 
 97. Technical Industries, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 911. 
 98. Id. at 913.  
 99. Id. 
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their return has been made.”100 The court expressly distinguished 
these circumstances from “a plaintiff merely show[ing] a defendant is 
in possession of trade secrets.”101 In FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish,102 
the court relied upon this same distinction in finding that there was no 
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets by a departing engineer 
who had downloaded his employer’s database onto a personal hard 
drive and retained this information following his employment.103 In 
the eyes of the court, the engineer had a reasonable explanation for 
downloading the data (due to slow computer network he needed to 
work from home), plus the engineer destroyed the hard drive prior to 
filing of the lawsuit.104 There was no evidence that the engineer had 
accessed or used the data in connection with his new business venture 
before the drive was destroyed.105 Accordingly, nothing more than 
mere possession of a trade secret by a departing employee had been 
shown, and this was not sufficient to establish threatened trade secret 
misappropriation.106 The court said that to hold otherwise would mean 
“an employer could bring a trade secret action after an employee 
downloads a company document and deletes the document from his 
or her laptop computer at home. A similar action could be brought 
where company messages are left on the employee’s e-mail or phone 
answering machine and deleted after the employee changes jobs.”107 
Central Valley, through these “variants,” essentially 
distinguishes threatened misappropriation as requiring evidence of 
bad behavior by the departing employee, separate and additional to 
anything they may know.108 The court in FLIR Systems cited Central 
Valley as support for construing “threatened misappropriation” as “a 
threat by a defendant to misuse trade secrets, manifested by words or 
conduct, where the evidence indicates imminent misuse.”109 Mr. 
																																								 																				
 100. Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 528. 
 101. Id. at 528-29. 
 102. FLIR Systems Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1279. 
 103. Id. at 1278.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1279. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 527-528. 
 109. FLIR Systems, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1279 (citing with approval the trial court’s 
construction of the meaning of “threatened misappropriation” in § 3425.2 of California’s 
version of the UTSA) (emphasis added); see also Edifecs Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 
(applying California law) (“In California, ‘threatened misappropriation’ means a threat by a 
defendant to misuse trade secrets, manifested by words or conduct, where the evidence indicates 
imminent misuse.” (citing Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp., 162 Cal. App. 4th at 527). 
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Pooley further explains in a recent post that the evidence demarcating 
actionable threats from nonactionable inevitable disclosure is that the 
former “focus[es] on the employee’s behavior” and whether this 
behavior shows the employee “can’t be trusted to honor the integrity” 
of the previous employer’s trade secrets, while the latter is 
“established merely by the importance of the information that 
someone knows.”110  
Decisions in which the courts have entered preliminary 
injunctions based upon a finding of threatened misappropriation 
under California law provide further insight into the different types of 
“words or conduct” that can be used to make such a claim. 
In Wyndam Resort Dev. Corp. v. Bingham,111 a former employee 
of a company that managed timeshare properties attempted to sell to a 
competing timeshare company the names of 40,000 timeshare owners 
whose properties were managed by his former employer. The court 
entered a preliminary injunction enjoining further solicitations based 
upon the finding that this conduct was actionable threatened 
misappropriation.112 The customer information at issue was deemed a 
protectable trade secret.113 The former employee was also 
contractually obligated to maintain the confidentiality of this 
information.114 
In Shippers v. Fontenot,115 the employee’s suspicious conduct 
leading up to departure “constitute[d] strong circumstantial evidence 
that Defendants are in possession of Shippers’ confidential 
information and that they are likely to use that information to lure 
customers away from Shippers.”116 The suspicious pre-departure 
included the employee’s “refus[al] to disclose to Shippers that he was 
leaving his employment to join AtMet, a direct competitor, instead 
claiming that he had no immediate plans for new employment and 
																																								 																				
 110. Dennis Crouch, What You Need to Know About the Amended Defend Trade Secrets 
Act, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Jan. 31, 2016), http://bit.do/CrouchAmendTradeSecretsAct. 
 111. Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp. v. Bingham, No. 10-01556, 2010 WL 2740158, at *6 
(E.D. Cal. July 9, 2010). 
 112. Id. at *5-6 (“Bingham's attempt to sell Plaintiffs' customer list to one of Plaintiffs' 
competitors constitutes threatened misappropriation since Bingham attempted to disclose 
Plaintiffs' customer list when he was contractually obligated maintain the confidentiality of such 
information. Plaintiffs, therefore, have shown that they are likely to prevail on their claim that 
Bingham threatened to misappropriate their trade secrets”). 
 113. Id. at *5. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Shippers, a Division of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Fontenot, No. 13-1349, 2013 WL 
12092056, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013). 
 116. Id. at *5. 
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that he expected to take some time off after his departure.”117 
Investigation revealed several extraordinary activities over the month 
leading up to departure. The court stated in pertinent part: 
Fontenot then spent his final month at Shippers rummaging through 
Prairie Tools, Shippers’ proprietary customer database, to obtain sensitive 
information regarding Shippers’ clients, including contact persons, “ship 
to” names, “bill to” names, addresses, telephone numbers, and pricing and 
order history. Fontenot conducted 494 inquiries in Prairie Tools during his 
last month, a vast increase from his regular use of the database. . . . 
Indeed, Fontenot’s searches included 285 pricing queries, more than twice 
as many as conducted by any other Shippers sales representative during 
the same time period. . . . Most suspiciously, the overwhelming majority 
of Fontenot’s searches targeted customers located outside of his sales 
territory.118  
The defendant’s business managers and IT staff testified that the 
employee did not need to access and use internal databases as had in 
fact occurred in order to fulfill his job duties, thus contradicting the 
employee’s explanation that his search activity had a legitimate 
business motivation.119  
In Lighthouse Worldwide Sols., Inc. v. Giandomencio, a senior 
executive who set up a competing business within approximately 
thirty days of his departure was enjoined from soliciting customers 
and competing for certain business.120 Following his termination, the 
executive retained a particle counting device whose design and 
specifications were protected as trade secrets and computer hard 
drives that contained confidential information.121 Shortly after his 
departure, the executive published a press release in which he 
announced his new company and offered for sale a very similar 
product the 3010R, which, as advertised, appeared identical to the 
Remote 3010 sold by the former employer. “A comparison of the data 
sheets for the Remote 3010 and the 3010R showed that the 
descriptions of eleven of twelve ‘[f]eatures,’ eight of eight 
‘[b]enefits,’ and eleven of twelve ‘[a]pplications’ were identical.”122 
																																								 																				
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (citations to trial record omitted). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Lighthouse Worldwide Solutions, Inc. v. Giandomencio, No. 06-7706, 2008 WL 
256974, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2008) (while this is a nonpublished opinion whose citation 
is restricted under Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115, the facts underpinning the court’s entry of 
injunctive relief may be helpful to the practitioner evaluating the strength of a possible claim for 
threatened misappropriation.). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at *8. 
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“Some Lighthouse customers expressed confusion regarding the 
relationship between Lighthouse and Adams Instruments and whether 
Adams Instruments released the 3010R in collaboration with 
Lighthouse.”123 The combination of the executive having taken 
confidential information directly relevant to his new, competing 
business, that he was able to offer a competing product within a very 
short time of departure, and the solicitation of his former employer’s 
customers under circumstances engendering confusion regarding the 
source the new company’s products, demonstrated substantial 
evidence of a threatened misappropriation.124  
Fitspot Ventures, LLC v. Bier125 involved the departure of the 
lead coding engineer from a technology company developing a 
mobile application. The engineer used subscription based “cloud 
platforms” to house and develop the source code on which he was 
working. The plaintiff company’s customer data and other essential 
proprietary applications code were stored on these platforms as well. 
Upon his termination, the engineer, contrary to company instructions, 
deleted data from his company provided computer and network 
accounts.126 In addition, the engineer accessed and disabled the links 
between the “cloud platforms” and the company’s network, 
effectively cutting off the company from its customers and the ability 
to manage their accounts.127 Forensic analysis revealed that the 
engineer had downloaded company data onto a personal hard drive 
prior to departure.128 In addition, the engineer took a position with 
another technology company that potentially benefitted from the on-
demand and real time functions of the former employer’s source 
code.129 After considering these circumstances, the court determined 
that the customer information and source code were protectable as 
trade secrets and that the engineer’s conduct demonstrated at least 
threatened if not actual misappropriation.130 Based on these findings, 
the court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the 
disclosure and use of all customer data and source code, the return of 
all access codes, the return of all data previously deleted from the 
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employee’s laptop, reestablishing links with the cloud-based 
development platforms and prohibiting the employee from using or 
disclosing the customer information and source code.131  
C. Some Practical Guidelines for Determining Whether There 
Is Sufficient Proof of Threatened Misappropriation 
It’s time for your meeting with the CEO, and as you push back 
from your computer the following email arrives from counsel:  
You’ve	asked:	
- Ok, so what more do I need? 
The	answer,	based	on	California	 trade	 secret	 cases,	 is	 that	
the	following	types	of	misconduct	by	a	departing	employee,	
either	separately	or	in	some	combination,	give	the	company	
a	 high	 likelihood	 of	 success	 of	 showing	 threatened	
misappropriation	under	the	DTSA	(the	new	federal	law):		
*** 
Unusual	or	excessive	transfers	of	company	data	to	personal	
devices,	 personal	 email	 or	 personal	 cloud-based	 storage	
accounts	
*** 
Previously	 tried	 to	 steal	 IP	 and	use	 it	 to	 set	 up	 competing	
business	 and	 has	 retained	 possession	 of	 key	 business	 and	
customer	information	
*** 
Retained	 data	 on	 personal	 devices	 or	 personal	 storage	
accounts,	and,	following	departure,	failed	to	delete	it	
*** 
Retained	 data	 following	 departure	 and	 there	 is	 evidence	
that	 this	data	was	 improperly	accessed	or	 copied	before	 it	
was	deleted	
*** 
Retained	 data	 and	 expressed	 intent	 to	 take	 action	 that	
would	require	use	or	disclosure	of	trade	secrets	
*** 
Former	employee	has	approached	competitors	and	offered	
to	share	confidential	information	
*** 
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Fails	 to	 acknowledge	 leaving	 to	 take	 employment	 with	
competitor,	 i.e.,	 they	 are	 not	 forthcoming	 about	 taking	
employment	with	competitor	
*** 
Excessive	 use	 and	 downloading	 of	 information	 from	
proprietary	databases	leading	up	to	departure	
*** 
Accesses	 proprietary	 company	 databases	 without	 any	
legitimate	business	motivation	for	doing	so	
*** 
Sets	 up	 competing	 business	 offering	 same	 or	 similar	
products	 to	 previous	 employer’s	 products	 having	 design	
and	specifications	protected	as	trade	secrets	
*** 
Unlikely	 that	 competing	 business	 could	 have	 been	
established	 so	 quickly	 without	 using	 prior	 employer’s	
confidential	information	and	trade	secrets	
*** 
Unfair	 solicitation	 of	 prior	 employer’s	 customers	 via	
misleading	statements	on	web	site	and	press	releases	
*** 
Deleting	 data	 from	 company	 devices	 or	 network	 files	
contrary	to	preservation	protocols	
*** 
Disabling	 and	 withholding	 access	 codes	 and	 passwords	 to	
company	accounts	containing	proprietary	data	
*** 
It is now twenty-four hours after your meeting with the CEO, 
who encouraged you to conduct an expedited investigation whether 
any of the guidelines supplied by counsel might be applicable to the 
departure of your engineer. You’ve since met with other business 
managers, as well as the personnel responsible for IT, Security and 
HR functions within the company. Your email to company counsel 
sums up where things stand, most notably the facts that you believe 
provide a high likelihood of success on a claim against your technical 
director for threatened misappropriation of trade secrets. Your email 
concludes, as follows: 
Forensic analysis of returned devices shows significant 
deletions of data as well as transfer to personal email 
and cloud accounts. These deletions are contrary to 
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instructions given to him at exit interview. No legitimate 
business motivation for this conduct. Highly likely this 
employee is still in possession of confidential data and 
trade secrets. Particularly suspicious is installation of 
applications on his laptop that are intended to mask 
deletion and downloads from his computer. 
Called the employee earlier today and demanded return 
of any data that he has retained. He did not deny that he 
was still in possession of the data. Refused to come in or 
commit to time to return anything. Said he would get 
back to me. His new employer issued a press release this 
morning that its first project is a self-driving application 
employing LiDAR technology that we have had in highly 
confidential development for past 9 months—are they 
using our IP to get head start? I know we don’t have 
evidence the employee is using or has disclosed our IP, but 
CEO says we’re authorized to seek immediate injunctive 
relief to address threat that a theft has occurred. Next 
steps? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The great majority of trade secret theft is committed by insiders 
who depart to take positions in competitive businesses. Typically, as 
of the time of the departure, there is a significant threat of 
misappropriation, but there is no evidence of actual use or disclosure 
of the trade secrets. Injunctive relief is available for both threatened 
and actual misappropriation under state trade secret laws as well as 
the new federal law, the DTSA.  
There are advantages to the former employer who wants to assert 
a claim for threatened misappropriation of filing under the DTSA. 
However, there is little federal precedent on the proofs required to 
make such a claim, creating uncertainty and increasing the risk of an 
expensive misjudgment about the strength of the case. The solution is 
to refer to cases applying California trade secret law on threatened 
misappropriation to predict the proofs required on the same claim 
under the DTSA. This makes sense because the DTSA shares with 
California a pro-employee mobility philosophy that rejects inevitable 
disclosure as a means of establishing an actionable misappropriation 
claim. 
California cases differentiate claims of threatened 
misappropriation from claims of “inevitable disclosure” based on the 
former requiring proof of words or conduct manifesting a threat of 
imminent misuse of trade secrets as compared to the latter’s inference 
540 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.   [Vol. 33 
merely from what is known that a threat may exist. Employers 
holding trade secrets and proprietary information, their former 
employees, business partners and contractors, and counsel 
representing any of these persons or parties, can glean from these 
cases specific and practical guidelines for evaluating whether the 
evidence is sufficient to obtain an injunction enjoining threatened 
misappropriation under the DTSA. These guidelines better inform the 
determination whether a former employer seeking to prevent an 
insider from stealing its IP has what it takes to “make a federal case 
out of it.” 
